iris
Post
View thread root →
User Avatar
Anthony Towns [ARCHIVE]
📅 Original date posted:2021-10-12 📝 Original message: On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 04:18:37AM +0000, ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev wrote: > > A+P + max(0, B'-B)*0.1 to Alice > > B-f - max(0, B'-B)*0.1 to Bob > So, if what you propose is widespread, then a theft attempt is costless: That's what the "max" part prevents -- if your current balance is B and you try to claim an old state with B' > B for a profit of B'-B, Alice will instead take 10% of that value. (Except maybe all the funds they were trying to steal were in P' rather than B'; so better might have been "A+P + max(0, min(B'+P'-B)*0.1, B)") Eltoo would enable costless theft attempts (ignoring fees), particularly for multiparty channels/factories, of course, so getting the game theory right in advance of that seems worth the effort anyway. Cheers, aj
0
0
User Avatar
Anthony Towns [ARCHIVE]
📅 Original date posted:2021-10-11 📝 Original message: On Sat, Oct 09, 2021 at 11:12:07AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote: > 2. The balance transaction - tracks the funding transaction, contains > a "balance" output for each of the participants. > 3. The inflight transactions - spends a balance output from the balance > transaction and provides outputs for any inflight htlc/ptlc transactions. > 4. Layered transactions - spends inflight htlc/ptlc outputs by revealing > the preimage, while still allowing for the penalty path. I don't think the layering here quite works: if Alice forwarded a payment to Bob, with timeout T, then the only way she can be sure that she can either reclaim the funds or know the preimage by time T is to close the channel on-chain at time T-to_self_delay. Any time later than that, say T-to_self_delay+x+1, would allow Bob to post the inflight tx at T+x (prior to Alice being able to claim her balance directly due to the to_self_delay) and then immediately post the layered transaction (4, above) revealing the preimage, and preventing Alice from claiming the refund. Cheers, aj
0
0