📅 Original date posted:2022-07-11 📝 Original message:Oops, you are right. We need the bribe to be the output of the coinbase, but due to the maturity rule, it isn't really a bribe. Too bad coinbases cannot take other coinbase outputs as inputs to bypass the maturity rule. I guess that means the bribe has to be by leaving transactions in the mempool. Also your point about centralization pressure is well taken. On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 5:56 PM Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote: > On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 05:36:52PM -0400, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 04:35:02PM -0400, Russell O'Connor via > bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > > What happens after that I'm not sure. > > > > > > > > > > Miners will learn to create anyone-can-spend outputs to bribe other > miners > > > to build on their block rather than reorg it. (Due to the coinbase > > > maturity, this will require some amount of floating capital.) > > > > ...and that's a disaster for mining centralization, because the smaller > miners > > need to pay larger bribes than larger miners. Not to mention having to > keep > > capital around to do it. > > Also, note how from a practical point of view, we'll need to add a new > type of > tx that's only valid in a specific block, or other miners will just reorg > those > anyone-can-spend outputs to steal them. It's not all that trivial to > actually > do that... you'd have to have a signature that commits to the non-segwit > part > of the coinbase outputs. Ugh. > > -- > petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20220711/2b9c824a/attachment.html>