Post
📅 Original date posted:2016-08-03
📝 Original message:This would honestly work. It forces the attacker to go through with the
clearing phase which simultaneously makes it possible to "cancel" the TX
through another logic branch before the timeout occurs. I'd say that would
meet the needs of a clearing mechanism / fraud prevention system for an
exchange perfectly while requiring minimal changes to the software.
Very, very smart idea. A++, would read again.
On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 9:55 AM, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 7:16 PM, Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> The reason why I bring this up is existing OP codes and TX types don't
>> seem suitable for a secure clearing mechanism;
>>
>
> I think reversing transactions is not likely to be acceptable. You could
> add an opcode that requires that an output be set to something.
>
> [target script] SPENDTO
>
> This would require that [target script] is the script for the
> corresponding output. This is a purely local check.
>
> For example, if SPENDTO executes as part of the script for input 3, then
> it checks that output 3 uses the given script as its scriptPubKey. The
> value of input 3 and output 3 would have to be the same too.
>
> This allows check sequence verify to be used to lock the spending script
> for a while. This doesn't allow reversal, but would give a 24 hour window
> where the spenders can reverse the transaction.
>
> [IF <1 day> CSV DROP <live public key> CHECKSIG ELSE <offline protected
> key> CHECKSIG] SPENDTO <live public key2> CHECKSIG
>
> Someone with the live public key can create a transaction that spends the
> funds to the script in the square brackets.
>
> Once that transaction hits the blockchain, then someone with the <offline
> protected key> has 24 hours to spend the output before the person with the
> live keys can send the funds onward.
>
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📅 Original date posted:2016-08-04
📝 Original message:On Wednesday, August 03, 2016 6:16:20 PM Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> In light of the recent hack: what does everyone think of the idea of
> creating a new address type that has a reversal key and settlement layer
> that can be used to revoke transactions?
This isn't something that makes sense at the address, since it represents the
recipient and not the sender. Transactions are not sent from addresses ever.
> You could specify so that transactions "sent" from these addresses must
> receive N confirmations before they can't be revoked, after which the
> transaction is "settled" and the coins become redeemable from their
> destination output. A settlement phase would also mean that a transaction's
> progress was publicly visible so transparent fraud prevention and auditing
> would become possible by anyone.
This is already possible. Just nLockTime your withdrawls for some future
block. Don't sign any transaction that isn't nLockTime'd at least N blocks
beyond the present tip.
Luke
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