iris

📅 Original date posted:2012-01-31 📝 Original message:> Cool design.  It seems resilient to many attacks.  A Sybil attack > coming from a large botnet (which controls addresses in many ranges) > can still fill all buckets in both tables, I think.  As far as I can > tell, that wasn't possible with the old design. Given the randomness in Pieter's design, that seems extremely unlikely / difficult to do. Is it possible to do a back-of-the-envelope calculation to figure out what percentage of nodes on the network an attacker would have to control to have a (say) 1% chance of a successful Sybil attack? I like this change; I'd like to pull it for the 0.6 release. I've also been wondering if it is time to remove the IRC bootstrapping mechanism; it would remove a fair bit of code and we'd stop getting reports that various ISPs tag bitcoin as malware. When testing the list of built-in bootstrapping IP addresses I always connect fairly quickly, and the DNS seeding hosts seems to be working nicely, too. -- -- Gavin Andresen
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